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⚡IMPACT LEVEL 3 — NOTEWORTHY

Epstein File EFTA01199747: Reiter, Harvard and Minor (DS9)

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This document contains academic references to scientific research about the evolution of extortion in game theory, specifically citing academic papers about prisoner's dilemma and strategic interactions in structured populations.

📋 Key Excerpts15

PersonKeyword
Excerpt 1
Hilbe C Nowak MA, Sigmund K (2013) The evolution of **extortion** in iterated pris- 715 654 3.
Excerpt 2
Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB (2013) From **extortion** to generosity, evolution in the Iterated 656 Prisoner's Dilemma.
Excerpt 3
Szolnoki A, Perc M (2014) Evolution of **extortion** in structured populations.

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